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Abstract
This survey gives insight into the ongoing research in ﬁnancial frictions modeling. The
recent ﬁnancial turmoil has fueled interest in operationalizing ﬁnancial frictions concepts
and introducing them into tools for policy makers. The rapid growth of the literature
on these issues is the motivation for our review of the presented approaches. The em-
pirical facts that motivate the inclusion of ﬁnancial frictions are surveyed. This survey
provides a description of the basic approaches for introducing ﬁnancial frictions into dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium models. The signiﬁcance and empirical identiﬁca-
tion of the ﬁnancial accelerator effect is then discussed. The role of ﬁnancial frictions
models in CNB monetary and macroprudential policy is also described. It is concluded
that given the heterogeneity of the approaches to ﬁnancial frictions it is beneﬁcial for the
conduct of monetary policy to focus on the development of satellite approaches. The role
of ﬁnancial frictions in DSGE models for macroprudential policy is also discussed, as
these models can be used to generate stress-testing scenarios. It can be concluded that
DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions could complement current stress-testing practice,
but are not able to replace stress tests.
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Nontechnical Summary
The recent ﬁnancial turmoil initiated an extensive debate on the prospects of current economic
modeling strategies, on the future macroeconomic agenda and on the causes of the crisis. Until
recently, the workhorse general equilibrium models used for analysis and forecasting abstracted
from modeling credit markets or frictions originating from the ﬁnancial sector. However, the
theoretical and empirical literature on credit market imperfections is rapidly expanding and
could offer arguments for introducing ﬁnancial frictions into DSGE models.
The “ﬁnancial accelerator” is the most common feature of the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions
into models. This mechanism implies that endogenous forces in credit markets amplify and
propagate shocks to the real economy. Depending on the micro-foundations of the acceleration
mechanism, two main approaches can be distinguished in the literature.
Financial frictions can be introduced by capturing ﬁrms’ balance sheet effects on investment by
relying on a one-period stochastic optimal debt contract with costly state veriﬁcation. The key
aspect is that such a setting allows endogenous determination of the “external ﬁnance premium”
deﬁned as the difference between the cost of external sources of funding and the opportunity
cost of funds internal to the ﬁrm. Due to the agency problem in lending, the external ﬁnance
premium depends inversely on borrowers’ net worth and ampliﬁes the responses to ﬁnancial
shocks.
Also, by introducing collateralized loans, the ﬁnancial accelerator effect can be introduced into
models with durable assets. Endogenous collateral constraints link the credit capacity of bor-
rowers to the value of their asset holdings. In good times, increased asset values allow ﬁnan-
cially constrained agents to expand their borrowing and increase consumption and investment,
thus further stimulating real activity. On the contrary, unfavorable disturbances decrease the
value of the collateral and induce an additional cut in expenditures, thus amplifying adverse
economic shocks.
Recent literature also attempts to deﬁne a role for the banking sector, where ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries have an active role in determining market prices or the supply of ﬁnancial assets. These ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries can operate in a framework of either perfect competition or monopolistic
competition. This allows modeling of interest rate setting behavior and thus the heterogeneity
in the adjustment of bank rates to changing conditions in money market interest rates.
The use of ﬁnancial frictions DSGE models in practical monetary policy is limited by the ab-
sence of a standardized ﬁnancial frictions approach, as the numerous approaches that do exist
differ signiﬁcantly in their results. Due to uncertainty in the choice of approach, the CNB’s
policy is to develop several alternative satellite models which supplement the core prediction
model. The use of DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions in macroprudential policy is even less
straightforward than in the case of monetary policy. DSGE models can be used to create stress
testing scenarios, as they can improve the ﬁt of the satellite models for stress testing. An ad-
vantage could arise from extending the prediction horizon of stress tests, as this could improve
modeling of the gradual build-up of risks during a “boom and bust” ﬁnancial cycle. Therefore,
DSGE models could bring new insights to the time dimension of systemic risk and improve
modeling of the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial sector. However, the extended DSGE models are
not designed to replace stress testing, especially in its cross-sectional dimension.Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 3
1. Introduction
In this work, the recent literature focusing on ﬁnancial frictions in the framework of gen-
eral equilibrium macroeconomic models is reviewed. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models have recently become a very popular tool for describing economies not only
in academia, but also in many central banks, where they are now a major part of the decision-
making process. The popularity of DSGE models stems from the presence and rigorous treat-
ment of microeconomic foundations describing the behavior of economic agents. The presence
of microeconomic foundations allows for more detailed and structured analysis of the origins
and evolution of observed business cycles than econometric models (VAR and VECM) can
provide.
Despite the vast theory developed and used in practice, the standard DSGE models do not
include the interaction of ﬁnancial markets with the rest of the economy. Most macroeconomic
theories and applications assume smooth and perfect functioning of ﬁnancial markets. These
simplifying assumptions allow for abstraction from the constraints present in markets and make
market arrangements less complex. Due to this abstraction from constraints and arrangements,
the implications of market imperfections for business cycles are included in standard models
only implicitly or insufﬁciently, or are even ignored. Interest in the investigation of interactions
between ﬁnancial markets and the rest of the economy grows signiﬁcantly at times of recession
(e.g. the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 and the sub-prime crisis in 2008), when rigidities and
constraints are apparent in the functioning of ﬁnancial markets.
However, the origins of the interest in investigating the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial markets on busi-
ness cycles can be found in the work of Gertler (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989), long
before the Asian ﬁnancial crisis erupted. The introduction of ﬁnancial rigidities led to the cre-
ation of models that distinguish the sources of capital for funding the investment projects of
economic agents. Further development led to the construction of models with constraints on
the amount of credit available for investment (Iacoviello (2005)). However, a common charac-
teristic of the aforementioned papers is the absence of ﬁnancial intermediaries, e.g. banks or
capital funds. Due to this drawback the theoretical development of the models also focused on
the explicit speciﬁcation of the role of banks.
The recent interest in the investigation of ﬁnancial rigidities has been fueled by the sub-prime
crisis and its wide and signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁnancial sector and the economy. Therefore, a
signiﬁcant increase can be observed in the number of papers focusing on theories of investment
behavior, the optimal structure of ﬁnancing, and asymmetric information (e.g. Brzoza-Brzezina
and Makarski (2009) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010)).
The recent interest in ﬁnancial frictions has also sparked interest in surveying the actual lit-
erature (e.g. Research Task Force Working Group on the Transmission Channels between the
Financial and Real Sectors of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) and Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2011)). However, these surveys are either not focused on DSGE modeling or are
quite brief and contain no description of practical uses. Therefore, in this survey the framework
used in the Czech National Bank (CNB) for macroprudential analysis is described.
The following section presents the motivation for models of ﬁnancial frictions stemming from
business cycle properties. In the third section, modeling of the external ﬁnance premium is
reviewed. In the fourth section, models with credit constraints are presented. In the ﬁfth section,
the speciﬁcation of the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in ﬁnancial markets is described. In the4 František Brázdik, Michal Hlaváˇ cek, and Aleš Maršál
sixth section, the potential use of models with ﬁnancial frictions in practical monetary and
macroprudential policy making is discussed.
2. Motivation
The most apparent property of economic output observable in the data is its long-term growth.
However, this growth is not always straightforward. Generally, ﬂuctuations around the trajec-
tory with a positive trend can be observed. These ﬂuctuations can be characterized by their
amplitude, persistence, and asymmetry.
Although a decrease has been identiﬁed, the amplitude of the observed ﬂuctuations is still con-
sidered signiﬁcant, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kocherlakota (2000). Also, the
ﬂuctuations are observed to be asymmetric: a decrease in the growth rate below its long-term
average is usually followed by a signiﬁcant period of slower growth. The research done by
Falk (1986) and Acemoglu and Scott (1997) documents more substantial and rapid periods of
economic slowdown than periods of boom.
The development of models capable of reproducing the characteristics of these ﬂuctuations is
leading to a better understanding of business cycles. It is also leading to advances in knowledge
of the impacts of monetary policy decisions. However, standard DSGE models are still not able
to reproduce the characteristics of economic ﬂuctuations without the use of extensive and per-
sistent shocks. Empirical studies focused on the identiﬁcation of shocks conclude that extensive
and persistent shocks cannot easily be found and explained (e.g. Cochrane (1994) and Summers
(1986)). Therefore, the reproduction of business cycle properties by models is still motivating
the search for a mechanism able to transform shocks in a speciﬁc sector of the economy into
extensive, persistent, and asymmetric ﬂuctuations in the aggregate output of the economy.
Notwithstanding the advances in reproducing business cycle properties, the identiﬁcation of
shocks that are driving cycles has come into the focus of the recent literature (e.g. Benk et al.
(2005), Christiano et al. (2006) and Jermann and Quadrini (2009)). In these papers, the identi-
ﬁcation of shocks is based on a combination of econometric methods and DSGE models. The
conventional approach to analyzing the extent and persistence of ﬂuctuations is to create VAR
models ﬁrst. Using VAR models it is possible to identify the amplitude and shape of the im-
pulse response functions for structural shocks. Moreover, the impulse responses of VAR are
compared to the responses of DSGE models. This comparison allows us to evaluate the mecha-
nisms of DSGE models, which originate from microeconomic foundations, in light of the extent
and persistence of the impulse response. Empirical papers such as Reichlin (2004) criticize the
standard DSGE framework for problems with modeling the characteristics of business cycles,
e.g. its inability to explain the observed degree of macroeconomic volatility or why ﬁnancial
markets may, in some cases, aggravate the consequences and persistence of shocks originating
in the real economy. These problems motivate the introduction of frictions originating in ﬁnan-
cial markets into DSGE models. Recently, this motivation has been increased by the effects of
the sub-prime crisis and subsequent economic slowdown.
The standard models assume that representative economic agents operating in perfect ﬁnancial
markets have immediate access to an unlimited amount of funding. In the recent literature fo-
cusing on the modeling of ﬁnancial markets, the mechanism for the transformation of shocks
into extensive and persistent responses is the presence of rigidities and constraints that limit per-
fect accessibility to an unlimited amount of funding. The mechanisms that can amplify shocksSurvey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 5
from the economy can be allocated to the following classes: cash-ﬂow constraints, collateral
constraints, external funds limits, and ﬁnancial regulations.
Cash-ﬂow constraints emerge when ﬁrms are not able to raise enough capital from their internal
funds and have to use external funds, which are usually more costly. Costs related to raising
external capital lead to an increase in the cost of investment decision-making in relation to
expected proﬁts.
Collateral constraints play a signiﬁcant role when ﬁrms with high leverage ratios face a deteri-
oration in the conditions for raising additional external funds.
Constraints on the supply of external funding are present when the possibility of ﬁnancial in-
termediaries screening the results of investment projects leads to the emergence of an external
ﬁnance premium and thus allows only a limited amount of external capital to be obtained.
A prerequisite for the introduction of ﬁnancial rigidity is therefore the invalidation of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem on the independence of a ﬁrm’s value from its funding structure.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) formulated their theorem under the assumptions of efﬁcient
markets (elimination of arbitrage opportunities), the absence of distortions from tax system
changes, zero bankruptcy costs, and perfect information. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have
shown that under these assumptions, for the total value of a ﬁrm it does not matter whether the
funds of the ﬁrm are increased by shares or loans.
If the Modigliani-Miller theorem is at least approximately in line with reality, it is possible to
omit the role of ﬁnancial markets in obtaining funds because ﬁnancial characteristics will be-
come unimportant in the decision-making process of ﬁrms and ﬁnancial agents. The omission
of ﬁnancial characteristics leads to simpler models. However, the omission of the role of ﬁ-
nancial markets has come under scrutiny since the ﬁrst tests of this theorem. As a result, an
increasing number of studies incorporate ﬁnancial factors into the models. Generally, the aim
of these studies is to identify the mechanism for the transformation of observed shocks into
ﬂuctuations with properties corresponding to the observed properties of business cycles.
Mechanisms capable of transforming sudden and short-lived failures of ﬁnancial markets into
sharp and prolonged ﬂuctuations in the real economy are generally labeled ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanisms. Bernanke et al. (1999) attributed the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism to the existence of an external ﬁnance premium (the credit channel, limiting the supply of
external resources) or collateralization of debt (the collateral constraint channel). In the follow-
ingsections, eachofthesechannelswillbedescribedseparately, eventhoughtheirincorporation
into the model has the same goal - the creation of a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
3. Credit Channel
This section is focused on ﬁnancial accelerator models, which originate from the presence of
an external ﬁnance premium. This premium is a key concept of ﬁnancial accelerator models,
whosehistorybegins withthestudiesofBernanke andGertler(1989)andBernanke (1993). The
same applies to studies that entail further improvements to the basic models, such as Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) and Fukunaga (2002). This section focuses on models where external capital
is used for productive purposes. A focus on the use of debt because of its tax advantages for
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In a frictionless world, a ﬁrm or entrepreneur is able to raise capital from external sources in
exchange for a share in its future stream of proﬁts. However, in the real world agents face
certain restrictions when searching for external sources of capital. These restrictions occur
due the limited supply of credit (credit rationing) or unattractiveness of the lending conditions.
The limitations on, and conditions of, lending originate from information asymmetry between
the borrower and the lender. The cost of external ﬁnancial resources is therefore a premium
(external ﬁnancing premium) which a debtor must pay to creditors, generally in the form of
higher interest on rented external ﬁnance. The costs of external sources can vary considerably
and depend on many characteristics, such as company risk, net worth, and the return on the
proposed investment project.
The external ﬁnance premium is deﬁned as the difference between the cost to the borrower
of raising capital in the ﬁnancial markets (external funding) and the opportunity cost of the
borrower’s use of internal resources. The data (see De Graeve (2008) or Banerjee (2002)) show
that external funding (equity borrowed from creditors) is almost always more expensive than
using internal resources (capital raised from own proﬁts). This is due to the increase in the
costs of lenders, who have to evaluate the prospects of success of the investment projects and
monitor the borrower’s conduct. For a better ﬁt of the data, models should try to account for
the observed positive premium on external funds. The existence of a premium is declared in the
assumptions of these models.
Due to the costs of processes associated with obtaining external funding, the external ﬁnance
premium is almost always positive, but it can be different for different borrowers. The external
ﬁnance premium which a debtor must pay is dependent on his ﬁnancial situation. A debtor is
ﬁnancially assessed in terms of his net worth and the actual amount of liquidity and the expected
income stream of his investment projects. The size of the external ﬁnance premium decreases
withincreasingnetworthorliquidityandaprovenrecordofrealizationofsuccessfulinvestment
projects. A debtor with a better ﬁnancial position and history is therefore rewarded by a lower
cost of external sources of capital.
A fundamental property of the external ﬁnance premium is its counter-cyclical nature (see,
for example, Besley et al. (2008)) because the ﬁrm’s income and worth increase in periods of
economic growth and this improves its ﬁnancial position (pro-cyclicality of proﬁts and asset
prices). A shock occurring in the ﬁnancial markets (a change in the availability of external
resources), will propagate to the rest of the economy. In the event of an adverse shock, the
external ﬁnance premium will increase and this increases the cost of obtaining external funding
and worsens the ﬁnancial position of the debtor. The further deterioration in ﬁnancial position
leads to a further increase in the premium and a further reduction in demand for funding. The
decrease in the utilization of resources leads to a reduction in investment projects and thus
reduces economic output and the future stream of proﬁts from projects. The less proﬁtable
projects lead to an increase in dependence on external funding and a decrease in net worth,
leading to an increase in the premium. This shows how a small shock can, via the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism, signiﬁcantly affect the whole economy for a long time.
One of the sources of imperfect functioning of ﬁnancial markets is the information asymmetry
that arises between the borrower and lender. Lenders providing funding for investment projects
face information asymmetry because they have less, or more imprecise, information about the
status of investment projects than debtors. Therefore, a signiﬁcant share of the costs of external
ﬁnancing of investment projects can be attributed to this asymmetry.Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 7
Due to the presence of asymmetric information, ﬁnancial contracts often include the possibility
of costly monitoring of the status of the investment project (costly state veriﬁcation) by the
creditor, because the control delivered by only monitoring the ﬁnancial market is considerably
simpliﬁed. Monitoring of project results, as assumed by Diamond (1965), is linked with a
signiﬁcant cost of obtaining information, which increases the project implementation costs.
Akerlof (1970) illustrates the way in which the presence of information asymmetry between
the parties to a contract may result in restriction of the functioning of the market or, in extreme
cases, in the establishment of barriers to the existence of a market. Akerlof (1970) shows that
suchbarrierstothefunctioningofmarketsariseinparticularwhencontractswithfullguarantees
are used. Akerlof (1970) also discusses measures that can eliminate or suppress information
asymmetry to improve the functioning of markets.
The types of contracts designed for the presence of asymmetric information and with the possi-
bility of monitoring have been studied by Townsend (1979). The theoretical micro-foundations
of these contracts assume the existence of producers of capital who generate capital through in-
vestment projects to which lenders lend their funds for a pre-agreed proﬁt. Producers of capital
constantly face the possibility of bankruptcy of their investment project. However, producers
can observe the results of their projects free of charge. Creditors have to pay for monitoring
when trying to ﬁnd the actual yield of the project in which their funding is used. The lender
faces the dilemma of when to opt for monitoring of project results, as it is not cost-effective to
monitor every project.
Moreover, monitoring costs are reﬂected in the premium paid by debtors. Despite these costs,
lenders use monitoring because without it the producers of capital would report lower than
actual income. Moral hazard occurs because it is optimal to pay the lowest possible ﬁnancing
cost, as Freixas and Rochet (2008) show. Townsend (1979) speciﬁes a contract type able to
handle this information asymmetry and describes the properties of this contract. The optimal
contract is deﬁned by a function describing the returns on the contract when bankruptcy or
success occurs. Also, the optimal contract deﬁnes the reported income threshold. The optimal
contract is speciﬁed as follows: after the reporting of a project return higher than or equal to the
threshold, the lender does not require auditing of the project result; if the reported proﬁt from
the project is lower than the monitoring threshold, the lender always requires an audit of the
project result.
The monitoring threshold is a decreasing function of the amount of the borrower’s capital,
because wealthier borrower can pay an agreed yield despite greater losses in the event of an
adverse project result. The monitoring threshold is an increasing function of the risk-free return,
which serves as an alternative to investing in the project. The difference between the monitoring
threshold and the risk-free yield serves as an impulse for the emergence of ﬁnancial agents who
mediate the investment contract.
3.1 Model by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduced entrepreneurs (producers of capital) and lenders into
a model of overlapping generations. A household in this model can be imagined as a mixture
of entrepreneurs and lenders. Entrepreneurs use ﬁnancial contracts in the form described by
Townsend (1979) to transform their assets and borrowed funds through investment projects into
capital goods. The capital goods are used by ﬁrms to produce consumer goods. In model by
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), only entrepreneurs can see the results of their individual projects.
Lenders have to pay monitoring costs to verify the results of investment projects. Using the8 František Brázdik, Michal Hlaváˇ cek, and Aleš Maršál
framework of an overlapping generations model in which agents live only a limited time avoids
discussion of the reputation and history of capital investment.
The role of households is to take decisions on the quantities of goods consumed and saved.
Saved goods are provided at a risk-free rate to a ﬁnancial agent (a lender or consortium of
lenders) and used by entrepreneurs (ﬁnancial agents) to implement investment projects. Figure
1 is a simpliﬁed sketch of the ﬂow of goods and capital in model by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989).
Figure 1: Sketch of Agency Costs Model by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) consider ﬁnancial agents who undertake business projects that
produce capital demanded by ﬁrms producing goods. Financial agents try to meet the demand
for capital by implementing investment projects and provide households with contracts with the
possibility of auditing project results.
Monitoring costs combined with uncertainty about the outcome of the project leads to a positive
premium on external resources, which restricts loans to the producer of capital. The existence
of the premium and its pro-cyclical nature are fundamentals of the ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism, which propagates supply shocks to all parts of the economy.
To analyze the dynamics of model by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a positive shock to the
productivity of ﬁrms is assessed. Expected growth in the price of capital leads to expecta-
tions of increased proﬁts of ﬁnancial agents. Therefore, they increase their demand for goods
used to produce capital and offer an increase in proﬁts from investment projects. The higher
proﬁts of entrepreneurs increase their wealth, resulting in a downward shift of the threshold
for monitoring. As a consequence of the positive shock to productivity and the increase in
net worth it is cheaper to acquire households’ savings for the implementation of investment
projects. This stimulates further growth of investment and capital production, which promotes
future economic growth. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) called this type of ampliﬁcation a shock
accelerator effect on investment income. Subsequent studies recognize this mechanism as a
ﬁnancial accelerator.
3.2 Model by Bernanke et al. (1999)
After the development of overlapping generations models, one of the ﬁrst attempts to intro-
duce types of frictions, as presented by Townsend (1979), into the standard inﬁnite horizon
framework was the seminal paper by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). They embed the contracting
problem into the standard real business cycle model. Therefore, later on, Bernanke et al. (1999)Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 9
present an advanced model with a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. Bernanke et al. (1999) place
producers of capital who face an external ﬁnance premium in a New-Keynesian DSGE model
which is characterized by the presence of price rigidities. In this model, ﬁnancial intermediaries
(producers of capital) face random termination (a mechanism capturing the ongoing births and
deaths of ﬁrms). This assumption of termination, as in older models, allows one to abstract
from investment reputation. Also, bankruptcy of ﬁnancial intermediaries prevents them from
accumulating enough internal funds to achieve independence from external sources of funds.
In this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, the economy is populated by households
(lenders), ﬁrms, and retailers. Households supply labor, consumer goods, and provide savings
as shown in Figure 2. In addition, the model includes a government which conducts both ﬁscal
and monetary policy. Government expenditures are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes and money
creation. The model is closed by a description of monetary policy, whose only role is targeting
inﬂation. The model of Bernanke et al. (1999) allows us to analyze the response of the economy
to a technology shock, a monetary policy shock, and a shock to government expenditures.
In this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, economy is populated by households
(lenders), ﬁrms and retailers. Households supply labor, consume goods and provide savings
as shown in Figure 2. In addition model includes a government, which conducts both ﬁscal
and monetary policy. Government expenditures are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes and money
creation. The model is closed by the description monetary policy and its only role is targeting
inﬂation. Model by Bernanke et al. (1999) allows to analyze the response of the economy on
technology, monetary policy shock and the shock to government expenditures.
The production sector is made up of heterogeneous ﬁrms set in a perfect competition environ-
ment which use capital and labor to produce consumption goods. The net worth of companies
originates from investing their capital and labor. This net worth of ﬁrms is considered when
obtaining the necessary capital to produce consumption goods via a ﬁnancial intermediary. The
ﬁnancial contracts used minimize the expected costs of ﬁnancial intermediation. Bernanke et al.
(1999) assume that only one-period contracts between borrowers and lenders are feasible. A
similar assumption is made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), as allowing for longer-term con-
tracts does not affect the basic results. The form of the ﬁnancial contract and the assumption
of production with constant returns to scale generate a linear relationship between demand for
capital and entrepreneurial net worth.
Unlike households, ﬁrms disappear and arise constantly. This prevents ﬁrms from accumulating
enoughresourcestobecomeindependentofexternalsourcesofcapital. Firmsraisecapitalusing
the above-described type of optimal ﬁnancial contract based on net worth. The role of retailers
is to do nothing other than buy consumption goods from ﬁrms and differentiate them costlessly.
Households then purchase constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregates of these retail
goods. With retailers offering their differentiated products in an environment of monopolistic
competition, price rigidity is introduced into this model. Proﬁts from retail activity are rebated
lump-sum to households.
Using this advanced model, Bernanke et al. (1999) show that the ﬁnancial contract provides a
monotonically increasing linear relationship between the capital-to-wealth ratio (leverage ratio,
debt to assets, or debt to net worth) and the premium on external funds.
As the net worth of producers is pro-cyclical, a counter-cyclical external ﬁnance premium also
appears in this model. The counter-cyclical external ﬁnance premium imposes limits on the pro-10 František Brázdik, Michal Hlaváˇ cek, and Aleš Maršál
Figure 2: Sketch of BGG (1999) Model
vision of funding for investment projects. The emergence of positive shocks reduces demand
for external funding because an increase in proﬁts from investment projects increases the net
worth of producers of capital. However, the counter-cyclical property of the external ﬁnance
premium can be questioned. As Gomes et al. (2003) show, the empirical success of the costly
external ﬁnance model lies in part in the fact that, for a ﬁxed amount of internal funds, more in-
vestment requires more borrowing. This raises the monitoring costs and, consequently, the cost
of external funds. It is this positive relation between investment and borrowing costs that gener-
ates an increase in marginal adjustment costs and slows down capital accumulation in the early
stages of an expansion, thus making it possible to obtain hump-shaped responses to underlying
shocks. However, while this rise in marginal costs helps to generate large volatility in stock
returns, it is necessarily associated with a pro-cyclical rise in the default premium, a feature
that is at odds with the data. Thus, the very mechanism behind the realistic movements in key
aggregates is also responsible for the model’s shortcoming along the asset-pricing dimension.
Bernanke et al. (1999) expand their analysis of business cycles by comparing models with and
without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. The authors note that the presence of a ﬁnancial
accelerator may explain the extent and persistence of ﬂuctuations, which are a response to
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As the impulse responses show, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism itself does not deliver
the desired properties of the responses. Therefore, Bernanke et al. (1999) comment on the
drawbacks of their model. First, they mention the immediate response to the monetary policy
shock in the model. In the real world this response is usually delayed. Bernanke et al. (1999)
show that by adding a delay in the investment process it is possible to correct this deﬁciency.
Second, to increase the amount of ﬁrm heterogeneity the authors introduce ﬁrms with easy and
less easy access to credit. As they still view their model as restricted, they propose several
extensions, e.g. the introduction of a nontrivial role for banks, nominal debt contracts, and
the use of an open economy model. Some of these extensions are discussed in the following
section.
3.3 Further Extensions of Models
An early extension of the framework by Bernanke et al. (1999) is presented by Christiano et al.
(2003) in their analysis of the Great Depression. Christiano et al. (2003) state that to capture
the key forces of economic cycles, features such as perceptions of risk, disturbances to labor
demand and capacity utilization, and wage frictions should be introduced into the model. Also,
the model should incorporate a banking system which is rich enough that one can consider the
interactions between real economic activity and various monetary aggregates such as currency,
bank reserves, and demand deposits.
Using the extended model, Christiano et al. (2003) replicate the important features of the data
observed during the Great Depression. In this period, they also identiﬁed an increase in house-
holds’ preferences for holding money and a shift away from the formation of savings. Accord-
ing to the authors, the reduction of savings led to the emergence of a restriction on the amount
of external funds available for capital creation and to growth in the external ﬁnancing premium.
The authors conclude that the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism strengthened the liquidity pref-
erence shock and affected the rest of the economy.
The model of Aoki et al. (2004) extends the model of Bernanke et al. (1999) to include invest-
ment in housing. In Aoki et al. (2004), producers of capital are replaced by homeowners, who
undertake investment projects that result in the provision of residential services to households,
as Figure 3 shows.
Homeowners face an external ﬁnance premium when searching for capital for their purchases of
real estate. The motivation for this paper is based on the strong pro-cyclical nature of residen-
tial investment and house prices because residential investment costs depend on the structure of
household wealth. Also, the demand for houses depends on the return on housing services pro-
vision and the expected marginal cost of ﬁnancing. The model of Aoki et al. (2004) containing
the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is able to replicate the characteristics of the data (housing
investment, housing prices, and consumption) and highlights the importance of the presence of
an external ﬁnance premium to account for these properties.
The implications of including an external ﬁnance premium in the DSGE framework in order
to match the data characteristics are generally based on the comparison of different models.
Meier and Müller (2006) compare the model with a ﬁnancial accelerator and the model with
increasing capital adjustment costs. They focus on the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism, and so they primarily examine the responses to a monetary policy shock. They argue
that both models are able to replicate the characteristics of the observed data on investment. As
a result, the authors do not consider the external ﬁnancing mechanism to be more important12 František Brázdik, Michal Hlaváˇ cek, and Aleš Maršál
Figure 3: Flow of Funds and Services in Model by Aoki et al. (2004)
than the mechanism of costly investment for description of the properties of the transmission
mechanism.
As most ﬁnancial contracts are speciﬁed in nominal terms, Christiano et al. (2010) developed
a ﬁnancial accelerator model that allows producers to raise capital through nominal contracts.1
By comparing the model with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism they identiﬁed
only very small differences resulting from the inclusion of the external ﬁnancing premium. The
responses to demand shocks in their model with the ﬁnancial accelerator do not show signiﬁcant
differencestothemodelwithouttheﬁnancialaccelerator. Theauthorsalsoidentiﬁedonlyminor
differences in the extent of ﬂuctuations in real output and investment. Due to the use of nominal
contracts, the authors attribute only minor importance to the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
in explaining the observed ﬂuctuations in economic cycles as compared to the aforementioned
studies.
Similarly as Christiano et al. (2010), Christensen and Dib (2008) extend the model of Bernanke
et al. (1999) by two important features. First, the debt contracts in the extended model are
written in terms of the nominal interest rate, which better reﬂects the nature of debt contracts
in the United States and other developed economies. This adds the possibility of debt-deﬂation
effects as mentioned in the literature on the Great Depression, e.g. Christiano et al. (2003).
Second, Christensen and Dib (2008) employ a monetary policy characterized by a modiﬁed
Taylor-type rule under which the monetary authority adjusts short-term nominal interest rates
in response to inﬂation, output, and money-growth changes. This is important because the
response of monetary policy is an important element determining the quantitative importance
of the ﬁnancial accelerator. As Bernanke et al. (1999) note, the greater the extent to which
monetary policy is able to stabilize output, the smaller is the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator in
amplifying and propagating business cycles in output or investment (see also Fukunaga (2002)
for an example).
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Using the extended model, Christensen and Dib (2008) conclude that the inclusion of the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator mechanism leads to a better ﬁt of the observed data properties (in terms
of output and investment volatilities and the likelihood-ratio test). The authors estimate the
parameters of the model with an external ﬁnance premium and show that this model of the
U.S. economy has a better ﬁt than the estimated model without an accelerator. Christensen and
Dib (2008) note that the inclusion of the external ﬁnancing premium allows the propagation
of investment shocks to the rest of the economy. They also note a gain in the ampliﬁcation
of ﬂuctuations caused by structural shocks. Moreover, Christensen and Dib (2008) focus on
changes in the impulse responses to demand shocks, which show that introducing the ﬁnancial
accelerator greatly ampliﬁes and propagates the effects of demand shocks on investment, while
dampening those of supply shocks. Increased demand of households for consumption renders
as a reduction in savings and increases the premium on external ﬁnancing of capital formation.
This increase in premium leads to restriction of the availability of capital required for the pro-
duction of consumer goods for households. This restriction limits the response of producers to
absorb the increased demand. However, in the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
the volatility of output and other real variables is marginal. This is partly due to the aggressive
response of the monetary authority to output variations produced by the estimated policy rule
when the ﬁnancial accelerator is included. However, as the variance decomposition shows, the
presence of the accelerator extends the horizon over which monetary policy shocks play a role
in output ﬂuctuations.
Generally, it can be concluded from the above summary of studies focusing on the external
ﬁnance premium that its presence mostly improves the ﬁt of the characteristics of the economic
data. The signiﬁcance of this ﬁnancial rigidity in capturing the characteristics of business cycles
is tested by placement in different models of general equilibrium. The comparison shows that
the effect of the external ﬁnancing premium is strongly dependent on the assumptions made
about the type of ﬁnancial contract, monetary policy, and the source of shocks. However, it can
be concluded that models with a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism may better capture the degree
and persistence of ﬂuctuations observed in the data.
External ﬁnance premium models are not able to generate the asymmetric character of the ob-
served ﬂuctuations. These models also neglect the direct effect of expectations of future eco-
nomic development at the current premium level because the premium is derived only from
the current value of the net worth of capital producers. Due to this fact, models with a ﬁnan-
cial accelerator mechanism have only a limited ability to capture the increase in bankruptcy
rates seen during economic bad times. This ensues from the micro-foundations of the models,
as they assume a constant length of investment projects and a constant probability of project
bankruptcy.
4. Collateral Constraint
Models with an external ﬁnancing premium do not contain limits on the availability of the
external funds needed by the producer of capital. The only limiting factor is the price, which is
increasing in the amount of external funding needed from the lender. An alternative approach to
modeling the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is to incorporate a limit on the amount of funds
available. The limit applies to the layout of the debtor’s balance sheet. The limitation arising
from the balance sheet is motivated by the creditworthiness of the borrower. The availability
and amount of the debtor’s assets facilitates the provision of loans by means of the debtor’s
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In models using a collateral constraint to impose limits on the availability of funding, in the
event of bankruptcy of an investment project that is being implemented by a capital producer
creditors may recover the debt only if the loans are fully secured. Loans are collateralized
by the debtor’s durable assets such as land, property, and long-term capital. These assets are
transferred to the lender in the event of bankruptcy of the debtor’s investment project. The
nominal value of these durable assets determines the amount of the loan the borrower can get.
In external ﬁnance premium models, the amount of the loan is constrained by the interest rate,
which depends on the net worth of the debtor.
As mentioned in the previous section, external ﬁnance premium models are not able to cap-
ture the observed asymmetry of the ﬂuctuations of business cycles. Collateralized debt is an
appropriate limitation of the availability of funds which may help to replicate the observed
asymmetry. The emergence of asymmetry in ﬂuctuations is motivated by the following com-
parison of the ﬁrm’s decisions in cases with and without access to external resources. A general
assumption of this comparison is that the allocation of ﬁnancial capital (deposits at the bank)
and production facilities (machinery) is optimal. In the case of sub-optimal allocation, the ﬁ-
nancial capital will be used to purchase production facilities to optimize the allocation. Assume
that the ﬁrm is not able to obtain external resources. Suppose that it unexpectedly receives a
temporary upward shock to income. Due to the assumption of optimal allocation of production
factors, the ﬁrm either consumes this additional revenue or increases its ﬁnancial capital.
When the ﬁrm is hit by an adverse shock or by a reduction in its income, the response depends
on the size of the shock. A small negative shock can be absorbed either by reducing the amount
of ﬁnancial capital or by reducing the consumption of resources, or by a combination of the two.
In the case of a large negative shock, it may happen that the ﬁnancial capital is depleted. The
ﬁrm then has to adjust the scope of its activities by reducing the number of production facilities.
However, under the assumption of the possibility of obtaining external resources, after the ﬁrm
has depleted its own resources it will prefer to search for external resources and the return to
the original optimal allocation of resources will be gradual and long lasting. Because the ﬁrm is
able to absorb small positive and negative shocks, while large negative shocks have real effects
on the extent of its production, the limit on the availability of funding acts as an asymmetric
propagator of shocks.
The models of debt securitization are based on original work by Hart and Moore (1994). They
describe a model of a ﬁnancial contract for raising external capital funds under the assumptions
that the debtor cannot guarantee success and may not be able to fulﬁll the terms of the project.
The possibility of repudiation of the contract or bankruptcy of the project leads to the existence
of an upper limit on debt - a credit limit. The size of this limit depends on the value of the assets
which the debtor can use to secure his loan.
4.1 Model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
In their seminal work, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) constructed a theoretical model in which
ﬁrms use contracts with fully secured debt to obtain capital resources. This model shows how
small-scale and temporary shocks to the productivity of ﬁrms can lead to signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations
that spread throughout the economy. The assets of ﬁrms are not only used for the production of
consumer goods, but also as collateral for raising capital. The source of the ﬁnancial accelerator
effect and propagation of technology shocks to the rest of the economy is the interaction of asset
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In model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), households - farmers and gatherers - are characterized
by different degrees of patience for consumption. Impatient farmers have a lower subjective
discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive to borrow. Hence, the ex-ante het-
erogeneity induces credit ﬂows between the impatient farmers and the patient gatherers. Also,
ﬁrms differ by the presence of credit limits arising from the presence of debt collateralization.
Firms own capital (land) that can be used either for production of goods or as collateral when
searching for external funds. The rest of the model is a fairly standard model of real business
cycles. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) demonstrate that even small and short-term shocks to pro-
ductivity or income distribution can cause prolonged changes in production, consumption, and
prices of capital.
Figure 4: Shock Acceleration in Model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
Figure 4 shows the effect of shocks as presented by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . A key mech-
anism in the ampliﬁcation and propagation of shocks in the model with debt collateralization is
changes in the value of collateral and their reﬂection in credit limits. A negative shock to the
price of land used to secure debt leads to a decrease in the net worth of ﬁrms. Producers that be-
come constrained by the credit limit are forced to reduce their demand for investment, including
investment in land. The decline in demand for investment leads to a decrease in expected future
output and income, thereby reducing expected demand in subsequent periods. The expected
decline in demand for land by credit-constrained ﬁrms and the clearing of markets (to maintain
equilibrium in the markets) forces credit-unconstrained ﬁrms to demand more land. This leads
to a decrease in the opportunity cost of holding land, which gives rise to a fall in the price of
land in the period of the shock. Due to the expected and actual decline in the land price, the16 František Brázdik, Michal Hlaváˇ cek, and Aleš Maršál
shock hurts the credit-constrained ﬁrms a second time and forces them to make deeper cuts in
their investment in land.
Kocherlakota (2000) presents the motivation for including an asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism. He assumes that the land is owned by ﬁrms and serves as an alternative production
factor to other means of production (machinery, manufacturing facilities). However, the land
can be used as collateral for obtaining external resources. In the case of a large negative shock
to demand, ﬁrms are forced to reduce the size of their manufacturing facilities. This leads
to a reduction in the price of land because land and manufacturing facilities are alternative
assets. This reduction in the size of operations leads to a reduction in the limit on the amount of
external resources that a ﬁrm can obtain by use of collateralized loans. This model mechanism
leads to further spread and ampliﬁcation of the response to a negative shock to demand for the
company’s products.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that the securitization of debt plays a signiﬁcant role in ampli-
fying the ﬂuctuations of economic cycles. However, Kocherlakota (2000), using his theoretical
models with secured debt, demonstrates that the mechanism of securing debt alone is not capa-
ble of delivering a strong ﬁnancial accelerator effect (credit constraints do not generate enough
ampliﬁcation and asymmetry). He shows that the strength of the ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism increases with an increasing share in the production function of factors whose alternative
function is debt securitization.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) assess the assumptions made by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to
demonstrate the signiﬁcant role of contracts with debt collateralization in providing debt con-
tracts as being too speciﬁc. Furthermore, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) conclude that the ﬁnancial
accelerator effects in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) are mainly due to constant returns to scale
in the production of investment projects (linearity of the production function) and to the will-
ingness of lenders to support a project of any size (risk neutrality of lenders). Under these
assumptions, the ampliﬁcation of ﬂuctuations in real economic cycles can be generated by a
small degree of smoothing and high utilization of assets to secure debt in the production func-
tion. Therefore, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) opt to use more realistic assumptions (decreasing
returns to scale, risk-averse players). Under these more realistic assumptions they demonstrate
the insigniﬁcance of the ﬁnancial accelerator effect for the ampliﬁcation of responses. As their
simulations indicate, large ampliﬁcation can be obtained merely with the “right" combination
of a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a large, but not too-close-to-one capital share,
and a sizeable, but not too-close-to-one share of constrained agents. They conclude that unless
one has this right combination of parameters, collateral constraints can generate ampliﬁcation
when compared with perfect-market models, but this ampliﬁcation is small.
The original models of the external ﬁnance premium and the models with collateralized debt
contracts rely on contracts in real terms rather than in nominal terms. Like Christiano et al.
(2010), Iacoviello (2005) is motivated by the criticism of real contracts. Iacoviello (2005) con-
structed a model with nominal contracts and demand for real estate. In this model, the holding
of real estate provides the beneﬁt of housing to households and can be used to secure debt. The
new model by Iacoviello (2005) is able to show an asymmetric response to shocks. In the case
of a period of positive shocks (e.g. to productivity or net worth) and under the assumption of
nominal contracts, the credit limit does not constrain the size of the loan. The author notes that
his model is able to capture the observed positive correlation of aggregate demand and real es-
tate prices. This supports the importance of the collateralized debt mechanism for the presence
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Iacoviello and Neri (2010) constructed a model to reﬂect the characteristics of ﬂuctuations
in household consumption. In this model, motivated by the recent developments in the U.S.
economy, households use their homes to secure debt. As Figure 5 illustrates, the model features
twosectorsofproduction. Thehousingsectorutilizescapital, land, andlabortoprovidehousing
services to households. Consumption goods and business capital are produced in the non-
housing sector by utilization of labor and capital.
Figure 5: Model With Collateral Constraints Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
As an extension to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) consider two types of
households: patient (lender, farmer) households and impatient (borrower, gatherer) households.
Patient households work, consume, accumulate housing, supply capital to ﬁrms, and supply
funds to impatient households. Impatient households work, consume, and accumulate housing;
they only accumulate the net worth required to ﬁnance the down payment on their home. Due
to an inability to fully enforce repayments of debt, impatient agents have to use the housing
stock as collateral. Also, the housing stock is considered as a separate argument of households’
utility function, in addition to consumption and leisure.
This model is able to explain the trends in real housing prices and investment over the last four
decades. The results support the importance of the mechanism of collateralized debt. Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) use their model to show that the presence of collateral constraints ampliﬁes
the ﬁnancial accelerator effect and propagates shocks from the housing market to the rest of
the model economy. Negative price shocks in the housing market, via the collateral constraint,
reduce the amount of household loans used to facilitate household consumption.
The relationship between house prices and household consumption allows the model to capture
the extent of ﬂuctuations in the growth of household consumption as observed in the data. An
assessmentofthevariancedecompositionshowsthathousingdemandcanexplain25%, housing
supply 25%, and monetary factors approximately 15% of the volatility of housing investment
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The ﬁnding of earlier studies that the impact of credit constraints is muted (e.g. Kocherlakota
(2000) or Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)) motivates Liu et al. (2010) to re-examine the comovement
of housing and investment. They consider the ﬁnding of earlier studies to be disappointing
and indeed puzzling in light of the recent turmoil in the housing market and the concurrent
deep recession. Persistent comovements between housing prices, land prices, and business
investment can be found in the U.S. data.
Liu et al. (2010) use a model to demonstrate that the credit transmission mechanism introduced
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is empirically relevant. In this model, the household consumes a
homogeneous good, housing services (land), and leisure, and supplies labor and loanable funds
in competitive markets. The entrepreneur consumes and produces the homogeneous good. Pro-
duction of the good requires labor, capital, and land as inputs. To ﬁnance consumption, produc-
tion, and investment, the entrepreneur borrows loanable funds subject to a credit constraint. In
particular, the borrowing capacity is constrained by a fraction of the present value of land and
the accumulated capital stock. Thus, land and capital serve as both inputs for production and
collateral for borrowing.
Liu et al. (2010) conclude that the previous literature ﬁnds muted impacts of credit constraints
because it focuses on total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. A TFP shock does not have a
large impact on asset prices because it moves future dividends and the risk-free interest rate
in the same direction. Previous studies fail to obtain positive comovements between housing
prices and business investment because they assume that a subset of households, instead of en-
trepreneurs (productive agents), are credit-constrained (Iacoviello and Neri (2010)). Allowing
entrepreneurs to be credit-constrained is an essential feature of the model of Liu et al. (2010)
for generating persistent comovements between the housing price and business investment. As
the housing demand shock raises the land price, it also raises the entrepreneur’s net worth and
borrowing capacity, which provides an incentive for and enhances the ability of the entrepreneur
to increase business investment. Through the dynamic interactions between the land price and
investment made possible by credit constraints, a shock to housing demand is ampliﬁed and
propagated to generate important macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Also, as in the section on the credit channel, the models of collateralized debt can be extended
to an open economy framework. The introduction of an external ﬁnance premium into the
small open economy model can be used to describe the spread of ﬁnancial distress among
open economies. To analyze the impact of the current economic crisis, Brzoza-Brzezina and
Makarski (2009) constructed an open economy model with a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in their model of the Polish economy helps generate sig-
niﬁcant real and nominal effects. By use of the model the authors identiﬁed the ﬁnancial shocks
that hit Poland in the period between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Brzoza-
Brzezina and Makarski (2009) argue that domestic ﬁnancial shocks can explain about 1 percent-
age point of the decline in Polish real economic output. This analysis reveals the importance of
foreign shocks, which explain up to 2.6 percentage points of the decline in output in the period
from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009.
As in the case of the external ﬁnance premium, the quantitative signiﬁcance of introducing a
ﬁnancial accelerator by means of collateralized debt is not straightforward. The ampliﬁcation of
the responses and the increase in their persistence are heavily dependent on the parametrization
and assumptions of the models used. In collateralized debt models, the use of nominal contracts
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in the external ﬁnance premium models, reinforcement of the accelerator mechanism can be
achieved by increasing the share of collateral in the production function.
The extent of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism’s effects also depends on the origin of the
shock that drives the ﬂuctuations. It is possible to observe signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation of the re-
sponses to ﬁnancial shocks, as these shocks affect the prices of the goods used to secure loans
(such as real estate and durable goods). By contrast, usually only a weak ﬁnancial accelerator
effect can be observed for non-ﬁnancial shocks, which can only slightly affect the amount of
the credit limit and demand for collateral.
However, the collateralized debt models also do not include a description of the banking sector.
There is no explicit role for the banking sector in these models. Creditors and debtors negotiate
their ﬁnancial contracts in the capital market without intermediaries. Therefore, in the next
section, models that feature an explicit role for banks are presented.
5. Banking Sector
In the previous sections, two mainstream methods introducing ﬁnancial rigidities into DSGE
models were presented: the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in the framework of Bernanke
et al. (1999)) and models with collateralized debt based on the work of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Iacoviello (2005).
The presented models of ﬁnancial frictions were constructed without an explicit role for banks
and thus the focus was primarily on the demand side of credit. The role of banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions was not speciﬁed, as ﬁnancial contracts are arranged directly in the ﬁnan-
cial market under the known form of a contract for the acquisition of external funding. The
main objective of the literature discussed in the previous sections is to capture the extent and
persistence of ﬂuctuations in aggregate output, whereas the literature introducing a banking
sector into DSGE models has been motivated mainly by the aim of explaining speciﬁc features
of the ﬁnancial crisis. The papers presented in the previous section are often concerned with
difﬁculties in explaining certain data features. The research on models with a banking sector
examines questions related to the role of banks in the ﬁnancial market. The goal is to explain
banks’ behavior.
The seminal models introducing a banking sector into the DSGE framework have focused on
highlighting the necessity for monetary policy to account for differences between the interbank
interestrateandothershortrates, e.g. thegovernmentbondrate. Thefollowingresearchextends
the framework by adding various ﬁnancial frictions and agents in order to study the role of
bank capital in business cycle ﬂuctuations. The ﬁnancial crisis has emphasized the importance
of systematic risk and sudden changes in that risk. Thus, the studies below search for the
foundations for the existence of risky portfolios. The liquidity crisis after the Lehman collapse
triggered the development of models studying the function of the bank capital requirement in
the process of loan creation. Last but not least, monetary policy actions have motivated studies
of the Fed’s unconventional policy instruments during the ﬁnancial crisis.
The pioneering model introducing banks into the DSGE model is by Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007). The model builds on the methodology of Bernanke et al. (1999). Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007) develop a banking sector in order to describe the interaction and differences
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relying on a standard model without a banking sector. The credit and balance sheet channels
are placed in the banking sector. The banking sector is set up similarly as a ﬁrm’s optimization
problem. Loan creation in the competitive banking ﬁrm sector is introduced by the production
function and cash-in-advance assumption
Loan production depends on collateral and loan-monitoring costs. The authors use a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function with two inputs: collateral and labor. Both government
bonds and capital can be used as collateral. However, capital is inferior to bonds as collateral
because the related monitoring costs of the true value of capital are higher than those for gov-
ernment bonds. Labor input is used to monitor loans supplied by homogeneous households.
The importance of the cash-in-advance assumption lies in its attribute of relating consumption
to deposits and introducing the medium-of-exchange property of money. To pay for consump-
tion spending, the household has to hold given amount of deposits at the time of purchase.
Therefore, the cash-in-advance assumption creates demand for deposits in the model.
The model by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) includes various types of interest rates. The
model uses as a reference rate the stochastic discount factor in the same form as can be found in
the basic New Keynesian DSGE model (one period risk-free security). Government bonds serve
as collateral. Due to this additional function, risk-free securities have to be more expensive (i.e.
deliver a lower yield in equilibrium than the reference rate). The authors assume that capital
has lower quality as collateral, hence it has to provide a higher yield in equilibrium to its holder
than government bonds.
The no-arbitrage condition between the loan market and the asset market determines the inter-
bank rate. The interbank rate, which is also the policy rate, is identical to the reference rate.
The loan rate must account for the cost of loan monitoring and collateral costs, therefore it has
to be higher than the interbank rate in order to avoid an arbitrage opportunity. On the perfectly
competitive banking market deposits must pay the interbank rate. However, because banks are
forced to hold reserves that do not bear interest, the deposit interest rate must be lower than
the interbank rate. This competitive banking market setup creates two opposite external ﬁnance
premium effects. The ﬁrst is called the “banking attenuator” effect, which dampens the effect
of monetary policy shocks. The second effect ampliﬁes monetary policy actions, similarly as in
Bernanke et al. (1999).
The spread between the reference rate and the loan rate is procyclical. This means that the
banking sector attenuates a monetary policy shock because the external ﬁnance premium grows
in booms and drops in recessions. The intuition for this lies in the formulation of the bank-
ing sector production function and in the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the household
when purchasing consumption goods. This constraint forces the household to hold cash for
goods purchases in advance and constitutes a need to hold deposits before buying consumption
goods. An expansionary monetary shock drives consumption growth in the model economy.
The higher consumption generates a proportional increase in the demand for bank deposits.
Growing loans require more banking services to monitor the collateral value. Consequently, the
concave character of the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the monitoring costs
grow faster than the amount of loans. The higher costs of lending given by the increased spread
between the loan rate and the reference rate discourage demand for loans and further dampen
consumption growth.
On the other hand, the “banking accelerator” effect arises from the fact that the monetary policy
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the price of capital have to increase. The higher price of capital increases the collateral value
and hence implicitly decreases the monitoring costs. The increased demand for deposits is
compensated by a lower marginal cost of loan production. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)
argue that for reasonable parameter values the “attenuator” effect is stronger and the external
ﬁnance premium is procyclical.
ThenextimportantcontributiontotheliteraturecomesfromCúrdiaandWoodford(2009). They
concentrate on similar questions as Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). The important novelty is
given by the speciﬁc model framework. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) develop a stylized model
with a banking sector where the basic New-Keynesian model is its special case. They differ
in their modeling approach by assuming heterogeneous households able to change their type.
This implies that the credit spread is a function of the markup in the intermediary sector and the
costs of the loan (monitoring and origination), both possibly exogenous or endogenous.
The modiﬁed model delivers an economy with ﬁnancial intermediation realized between house-
holds rather than households and ﬁrms. Half of households are lenders and the other half bor-
rowers. Borrowers have a higher marginal utility of consumption than lenders. As savers dis-
countthefuturelessthanborrowers, theoptimalityconditionsofthemodelcontaintwodiscount
factors. Consequently, the model produces two different interest rates. The lower interest rate
paid on deposits is equivalent to the policy rate. Adding the credit spread to the deposit rate
(lower rate) one gets the rate charged by intermediaries for borrowing. The spread between
the interest rate available to savers and the interest rate that borrowers pay for the loan is time
varying, and in their paper Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) consider the spread to be determined
by exogenous as well as endogenous factors. The endogeneity of the credit spread comes from
the markup in the intermediary sector. This markup varies in response to the total volume of
lending. Furthermore, the cost of loans has the character of intermediation technology as in
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), where labor input is needed to monitor collateral value and
the other input is collateral itself.
In order to keep the model tractable, Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) come up with an elegant solu-
tion and introduce insurance against both the aggregate risk and the idiosyncratic risk associated
with a change of household type. Without insurance, the distribution of the marginal utility of
income would be too dispersed because of the histories of each individual type of household
and the model would not have a stable solution. The fact that the change of household type is
random, together with the insurance, enables the authors to perform aggregation and derive a
stationary equilibrium. The heterogeneous agent approach allows the authors to abstract from
the assumption that households need to hold deposits before purchasing goods.
The paper’s main implication for monetary policy is that including the credit channel in the
standard New-Keynesian (NK) model does not fundamentally alter optimal monetary policy.
The response to a ﬁnancial shock should be the same as that to the linear combination of shocks
standard in New-Keynesian models. An interesting exception is the ﬁscal shock. In the basic
NK model, Ricardian equivalence holds, while in the model with credit frictions changes in the
path of government debt have signiﬁcant effects on inﬂation, output, and interest rates. These
effects arise from the assumption that government borrowing is not subject to credit frictions.
Thus, even if government borrowing crowds out private borrowing one to one, the absence of
credit frictions (production of public debt is cheaper) leads to higher output and a lower loan
rate. In other words, investors lending to the government do not require collateral and do not
pay for monitoring. Consequently, the growing volume of lending does not increase the time-
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Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) also suggest an answer to recent suggestions for closer monitoring
of changes in the volume of lending. In the presented model, the credit spread matters for
monetary policy. The volume of bank credit is only one of the determinants of the credit spread.
Hence, policy makers should focus their attention on the credit spread rather than the volume of
lending. Nevertheless, CúrdiaandWoodford(2009)showthatamonetarypolicyrulestabilizing
aggregate credit does not have desirable properties.
The inﬂuence of work by Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) lies in the fact that they build on the
broadly known baseline NK model and carefully discuss all its assumptions and its derivation.
This allows the authors to convincingly assess the implications of the credit market and its im-
perfections in a standard NK framework. The introduction of ﬁnancial intermediation through
heterogeneous households comes with a cost in the form of omitting the direct effect of ﬁnancial
intermediation on production. In the real world, however, ﬁnancial intermediation is triggered
by a time delay in the production process when ﬁrms need to borrow in order to buy input.
Frictions in ﬁnancial intermediation have a direct impact on the consumption-leisure trade-off
in the Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) model framework. The model does not capture the inter-
mediation where saving households lend to investing ﬁrms. Obstacles in this process have a
direct effect on production. Omitting this effect may give rise to false policy implications of
the model. The credit spread is the main ingredient of the model’s credit market. The spread
is nevertheless exogenously put into the model. It is not derived from agents’ behavior and is
therefore subject to the Lucas critique. The next drawback of the way the spread is modeled is
that it abstracts from the threat of default. Yet default is one of the main factors determining
the spread between interest rates. From this point of view, the model adds very little to the
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) model.
Chronologically at about the same time as Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), Christiano et al.
(2007b) ask if banking, and the ﬁnancial sector in general, are quantitatively important for
the business cycle and what the possible implications are for monetary policy. The character
of the motivating question is therefore in line with the research encompassing models relying
on agency problems and balance sheet frictions. Christiano et al. (2007b) extend the model of
Bernanke et al. (1999) by introducing a ﬁnancial sector. The banking sector is integrated into
the model using the methodology of Chari et al. (1995) and estimated by Bayesian methods.
The modeling approach to banking is in the spirit of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) in the
way liquidity is supplied. Instead of a loan production function, however, they use a deposit
production function. Christiano et al. (2007b) argue that the Bernanke et al. (1999) type of
ﬁnancial frictions improves the data ﬁt, but the banking sector plays a small role. The function
of monetary policy in accommodating ﬁnancial shocks is limited in their model.
To reﬂect issues associated with credit risk (pressure on a bank’s capital positions and liquid-
ity), further research using a banking sector in DSGE models integrates endogenous banking
capital into the bank’s balance sheet. Gerali et al. (2009) introduce a banking sector into the
DSGE model to study the role of banking intermediation, and in particular the implication of
tightening credit conditions and their transmission to the real economy. They merge the model
of Christiano et al. (2007b) and Iacoviello (2005) and extend it to include an imperfectly com-
petitive banking sector in both the deposit market and the loan market. This setup has important
consequences for monetary policy because the central bank policy rate is not transmitted fully
and instantaneously into households’ and ﬁrms’ decisions. The monopolistic power of banks
over the loan and deposit rate changes the pass-through of the policy rate. Gerali et al. (2010)
extend the model estimated by Bayesian method and provide a more thorough discussion of the
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Explanation of the stylized facts of the global ﬁnancial crisis motivates Christiano et al. (2010)
to further extend their earlier model (Christiano et al. (2007b)) in a way that can explain the
main elements of the crisis. They ﬁnd that liquidity constraints and changing risk perceptions
are the main determinants of economic ﬂuctuations. Financial frictions in the credit supply
turning market risk into systemic risk contribute importantly to the model’s empirical ﬁt. The
ability of the central bank to supply liquidity when the supply of credit in the banking sector is
low has signiﬁcant smoothing effects on the business cycle.
Another sub-class of models featuring a banking sector concentrates on analysis of the Fed’s
unconventional balance sheet operations in reaction to the consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) use a model with an agency problem between intermediaries and
their depositors to produce endogenous constraints on intermediary leverage ratios, as a drop in
banks’ capital has an impact on borrowing and lending. A speciﬁc feature of the model is that
the central bank acts as an intermediary. The monetary authority can borrow funds from savers
and then lend them to investors. The distinction from private banks lies in the fact that the
central bank does not face constraints on its leverage ratio. The central bank borrows against
collateral in the form of government bonds. By buying its own debt the central bank avoids
agency problems. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show that especially when the policy rate hits
its zero lower bound the net beneﬁts of unconventional monetary policy are signiﬁcant. This
model is extended in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) by the introduction of an interbank market.
The paper models the situation where banks are not willing to lend to one another. Banks
face an idiosyncratic liquidity shock which creates a deﬁcit or surplus of funds across ﬁnancial
institutions. Together with agency problems, the disruption to the inter-bank market affects real
activity. These models are used to illustrate the fact that various credit market interventions may
mitigate the negative effects of ﬁnancial frictions at times of crisis.
The most recent contributions to the literature dealing with the banking sector in DSGE models
go back to the roots of the ﬁnancial crisis and search for the underlying rationality in building
risky portfolios. The contribution of Gertler et al. (2011) focuses on explaining the motivations
of banks to take excessive risks. Their aim in their very recent working paper is not just to
match the banks’ vulnerability to risk, but also to explain why banks tend to build risky balance
sheets. The modeling framework builds on Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). The endogenous choice of a risky balance sheet is incorporated by a trade-off between
short-term debt and equity. The authors conclude that appropriately designed macroprudential
policy can mitigate moral hazard costs. Incentives for risk taking reduce the beneﬁts of credit
policies stabilizing the ﬁnancial markets.
The model by Dib (2010) stands out by offering a synthesis of much of what can be found in the
studies discussed previously. Dib (2010) uniﬁes many of the ingredients of previous research
and adds an analysis of a bank’s capital requirement condition and its effects on business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations. The economy is populated by workers and bankers maximizing their utility
functions. The difference compared to the heterogeneous households in Cúrdia and Woodford
(2009) is that the share of workers and bankers is ﬁxed and they do not change their types.
In addition, the utility function is derived from different variables in each group. Bankers are
assumed to be owners of both saving and lending banks. The role of bankers is to create a link
between changes in bank capital and changes in the real economy. This link allows the efﬁcient
market hypothesis to be rejected in the short run and highlights the default risk of the lending
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Dib (2010) assumes that two types of banks, saving and lending, operate in the heterogeneous
intermediary sector. Saving banks collect deposits from workers. They maximize their proﬁt in
a monopolistic market by setting the nominal interest rate and the composition of their portfolio
(solving a problem analogous to the one of ﬁrms). A certain share is invested in government
bonds and the rest is used to lend on the interbank market. The lending bank may make use of
injections of liquidity from the central bank, facilitating modeling of a quantitative monetary
easing. The lending bank is also allowed to swap part of its loans for bonds in order to simulate
a qualitative easing by the Fed. Moreover, banks can endogenously default (default is a control
variable in the model) on fractions of their interbank borrowing and bank capital returns.
Model by Dib (2010) model meets the expectation relating to models featuring ﬁnancial fric-
tions and ampliﬁes the propagation of supply-side shocks. As in Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007), however, demand shocks in the model with an active banking sector have dampening
effects on the propagation and transmission of shocks to real variables. Financial shocks affect
real variables much less in the model with a banking sector than in models with an external
ﬁnance premium and collateralized debt.
6. DSGE and Macro-prudential Analysis in the Czech National Bank
Though the ﬁnancial crisis has led to an increase in interest in DSGE models featuring ﬁnancial
frictions and an endogenous ﬁnancial sector, the models described in previous sections usually
comprise purely academic research and their policy-making applications are relatively limited.
This section summarizes some arguments discussed in connection with the practical use of such
models both in monetary policy and in macroprudential policy.
6.1 Use of Financial Friction for Monetary Policy Purposes
As summarized in the previous sections, and as discussed within the central banking commu-
nity, the potential gains arising from including ﬁnancial frictions in central banks’ prediction
models can be large.2 The extension of the models used by central banks to include ﬁnancial
frictions helps improve the ﬁt of these models and our understanding of the historical develop-
ment of economic indicators. Also, it can lead to improvements in the calibration of the relevant
coefﬁcients and elasticities. Extended models also strengthen prediction capability and thus im-
prove the conduct of monetary policy. Capabilities are further improved by an understanding
and quantiﬁcation of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy to the real economy. Ex-
tended models also support the development of supplementary types of analysis, as they can
help identify ﬁelds of interest for central banks’ analytical efforts.
Though many central banks have experimented with DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions (e.g.
the central banks of Canada (Dib (2010) and Christensen et al. (2009)), the Czech Republic
([Br˚ uha et al. (2011)), Italy (Angelini et al. (2011) and Gerali et al. (2010)), New Zealand
(Hoskin et al. (2009)), Poland (Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2011)), Sweden (model RAMSES;
Christiano et al. (2007b)), the United Kingdom (Saporta (2009)), and the European Central
Bank (NAWM model; Christiano et al. (2010) and Paries et al. (2010)) there is no uniﬁed ap-
proach that represents the “state of the art”, in contrast to the use of “traditional” DSGE models,
where the models are to some extent standardized (see Tovar (2009)). As 412-2011 discuss, this
is due to the following reasons:
2 Extensive discussions have been going on within the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs) founded by the
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 The review of approaches to ﬁnancial frictions in previous sections shows that there are
numerous approaches and variations thereof. These approaches differ in the nature of
the ﬁnancial frictions and also in their transmission to the real economy. Even relatively
small technical changes to the assumptions on ﬁnancial frictions can give rise to diverse
quantitative results.
 The models have to be focused on speciﬁc individual types of frictions to keep them
operational. It is virtually impossible to model several types of ﬁnancial frictions at once,
as this would make such models very complex. Parameter estimation and calibration
would be difﬁcult, and it would also be challenging to interpret the results.
 Interaction between different types of ﬁnancial frictions could lead to very complex im-
plications - interacting frictions could amplify or suppress each other.
 Acceptance or rejection of the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial frictions is complicated by the
fact that episodes of ﬁnancial sector turmoil are quite rare. This makes calibration and
estimation of such models questionable. Also, the relevant data series are not available in
sufﬁcient length or quality (for example, for a discussion of the quality of housing prices
for the Czech Republic see Hlaváˇ cek and Komárek (2009)) and so various proxies have
to be used.
Given the above-mentioned uncertainties relating to the selection of the relevant type of ﬁnan-
cial frictions for the prediction model, the CNB’s policy is to keep its benchmark G3 model
unchanged (for a description of the model properties see Andrle et al. (2009)). CNB policy is
to develop a set of several parallel satellite models using different types of ﬁnancial frictions or
less standard transmission mechanisms. There are several streams of model development going
on in the CNB research program. Some of the project results have already been applied, as
mentioned by Br˚ uha et al. (2011):
 The stream of research developed mainly in the project of Polanský et al. (2009) aspires
to incorporate the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism into a small open economy and takes
into account stylized facts about the Czech ﬁnancial sector. The models developed in
this stream consider an alternative assumption of original “state contingent contracts”
(Bernanke et al. (1999)) as well as an extension to “state non-contingent contracts” de-
veloped by Kumhof and Beneš (2011). The use of state non-contingent contracts signiﬁ-
cantly affects the dynamics of the model, as stated by Br˚ uha et al. (2011).
An alternative model in this stream of research uses similar assumptions to those pre-
sented by Christiano et al. (2007b). They demonstrate the incorporation of ﬁnancial
frictions into a small open economy and extend the standard DSGE model to include
modeling of the labor market.
A common feature of this stream is the use of the IRIS Toolbox, which is able to combine
the linear and non-linear parts of the model. Also, the parameters of the models are set
speciﬁcally for the Czech economy by use of Bayesian techniques.
 The stream of research developed in the project of Zdˇ enek et al. (2010)aims to include
housing markets in DSGE models. The models developed in this stream build mainly
on the collateral constraints assumption as presented by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and
Christensen et al. (2009). These models are aimed at extending the CNB’s G3 model. A
major extension of the model is the inclusion of rental housing, used mainly by impatient
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 There is also a stream of research that sets out to build DSGE models with a banking
sector, as in Franta et al. (2009) and Derviz and Seidler (2010). This stream aims to
develop a framework for examining the effects of macroprudential policies on the Czech
ﬁnancial and real sectors. These studies should facilitate discussion of the interactions of
monetary, macroprudential, and microprudential policies.
6.2 Use of Models With Financial Frictions for Macroprudential Policy Purposes
While the use of DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions for monetary policy is relatively straight-
forward (matching the properties of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and understanding the full
scope of monetary policy transmission channels), their use for macroprudential policy is much
more demanding. Their complexity means that there are almost no practical applications of
such models. Also, these applications are focused mainly on stylized evaluation of the effects
of macroprudential instruments on macroeconomic performance (notable exceptions being An-
gelini et al. (2011), Gelain (2011) or Paries et al. (2010)).
This results from the setup, as the objectives of macroprudential policy are broader than those
of traditional monetary policy and thus are still not fully settled (for a discussion of macropru-
dential policy issues see Frait and Komárková (2011)). Furthermore, restrictions on the use of
DSGE models originate from the fact that macroprudential analysis often orients itself toward
assessment of the vulnerability of a ﬁnancial system to exceptional but plausible events, which
are often related to non-equilibrium, divergent states of the ﬁnancial system. These states can-
not easily be modeled by standard equilibrium models, which are dependent on an appropriate
deﬁnition of the steady state.
However, DSGE models are often used in practice for creating scenarios for the most commonly
used tool of macroprudential analysis: stress testing (for a review of the use of stress testing in
central banks see, for example, ˇ Cihák (2006)). This is especially true for central banks that use
DSGE models for standard monetary policy analysis, such as the Czech National Bank.3
The use of DSGE models in the creation of stress-testing scenarios has advantages due to the
following features of this process. The stress-testing scenarios always include a “baseline sce-
nario", which is supposed to be the most likely scenario of future macroeconomic development.
Fromthepointofviewofconsistencyofexternalcommunicationindifferentcentralbankpubli-
cations it is crucial to present the baseline scenario in line with the ofﬁcial central bank forecast.
Also, compared to the various types of central bank prediction models (e.g., the previously used
multi-equation Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) used in the CNB, which was also used for
generating stress scenarios), DSGE prediction models introduce far more degrees of freedom
in the creation of stress scenarios. DSGE models usually include many sources of volatility
(shocks), allowing alternative trajectories to be modeled. Finally, DSGE models usually rely on
calibrated parameters, which can be altered to the match the requirements of the stress scenario.
This option can only be used in very speciﬁc cases.
This shows that stress scenarios based on DSGE models are much more ﬂexible. However, the
main advantage of using a DSGE model when creating stress-test scenarios is that it delivers
model-consistent future paths of the relevant macroeconomic variables.
3 For a description of the CNB’s DSGE model used for supporting monetary policy decisions, see Andrle et al.
(2009). For a description of the three generations of the stress-testing models used in the CNB see ˇ Cihák and
Heˇ rmánek (2005), ˇ Cihák et al. (2007) and Geršl and Seidler (2010).Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 27
The current banking sector stress-testing framework is illustrated in Figure 6 The DSGE model
generates the scenarios (part I of the diagram) used in the initial assessment of market risks
(interest rate and foreign exchange risks; see part II of the diagram). These are directly reﬂected
in banking sector balance sheets (part IV of the diagram), which form the main “body" of the
stress testing. The macroeconomic variables from the stress scenarios then enter numerous
satellite models. These satellite models include credit risk models for both the household and
corporate sectors (part III.1; for estimation of these models see Jakubík (2007)), credit growth
models (part III.2), housing price models, which are reﬂected in the loss given default (LGD)
for housing loans (part III.3; see Hlaváˇ cek and Komárek (2009)), and banking sector income
models (part III.4, see Geršl and Seidler (2010)). The outcomes of the satellite models again
enter the banking sector balance sheets and generate additional stress on banks.
The aforementioned individual satellite models often use different methodologies. The method-
ologies used range from simple ad-hoc approaches to banking sector income and LGD models
to more sophisticated Merton-type models for credit risk estimation. In this framework it is also
important for the individual satellite models to be interrelated, which causes other problems. 4
In addition to the impacts of different types of risks on banking sector balance sheets, the cur-
rent stress-testing framework includes models of interbank contagion, which try to capture the
role of interconnectedness within the banking sector (part V of Figure 6; see ˇ Cihák et al. (2007))
and also some feedback effects inﬂuencing the real economy (part VI of the diagram; see Geršl
and Jakubík (2010)). In contrast to the stress-testing framework, which is quite detailed, es-
pecially in its banking sector balance sheet segment, the feedback effects to the real economy
are quite stylized (they are based on feedback effects via the inﬂuence on bank lending and the
development of investment activity) and are not included in every stress-testing exercise.5
The above discussion of the current use of DSGE scenarios in stress testing might also produce
some guidelines on how extended versions of DSGE models featuring elements of the ﬁnancial
sector could help in creating more realistic stress-testing scenarios. Clearly the inclusion of the
ﬁnancial frictions described in sections 3 and 4 (i.e., in models without banking sector capital)
would lead to a wider set of model/scenario-generated variables, which, in turn, could lead to
better estimation of the satellite models (the selection of explanatory variables included in the
satellite models is constrained by their existence in the model used in the generation of the stress
scenarios). Moreover, inthesecondsteptheDSGEmodelextendedtoincludeﬁnancialfrictions
could widen the initial macroeconomic scenarios (part I of Figure 6) to encompass variables
that are now being generated by the current satellite models (e.g. defaults, credit growth or
housing price growth). Thus, such an “extended" macroeconomic scenario could under some
circumstances integrate some of the current satellite models. This could have some positive
features, as this approach could help to solve the above-mentioned problems with interrelation
of the individual satellite models. Moreover, such an extended macroeconomic scenario could
include some of the feedback effects between the real economy and ﬁnancial variables that are
not included in the current framework (e.g. the link between investment and loans to the private
sector and others) and are not modeled in the current setup.
4 This is depicted in Figure 6 by dotted arrows, e.g. the projected probability of default from the credit risk model
inﬂuences the share of non-performing loans which enters the banking sector income model with a lag. One could
also think about mutual interrelations between housing price growth and mortgage loan development and other
mutual links.
5 Though the results of the stress-testing exercise are published for the aggregate banking sector, this part includes
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Figure 6: Use of DSGE Models in Building Up Macroeconomic Scenarios for Stress Testing
The “second generation" of DSGE models featuring a ﬁnancial sector that already includes an
explicit banking sector (section 5) could lead to a third step of integration of DSGE models into
the stress-testing setup. In this case it could eventually replace the remaining satellite models
(e.g. the banking sector income model III.4) and to some extent even the “core" of the stress
testing, namely, the banking sector balance sheets (part IV of the diagram). This “cannibal-
ization" of the stress testing would have the clear advantage of model-consistent modeling of
feedback effects (part VI of Figure 6).
DSGE-based models could also help the current setup by prolonging its prediction horizon.6 In
fact, the current setup covers only one phase of the time dimension of systemic risk.7 Within
“boom and bust" cycles, stress testing covers only the “cleaning" or “resolution" phase, when
the risk has already materialized. However, its ability to model the gradual build-up of risks in
the “leaning phase" is substantially limited by this short horizon.
6 The stress test currently uses a 2-year horizon, but it is being prepared for extension to the 3-year horizon.
7 Systemic or macro-prudential risk is supposed to have two dimensions (see Frait and Komárková (2011)). One
is the time dimension, which reﬂects the build-up of systemic risk over time and relates to endogenous boom
and bust cycles and procyclicality in the behavior of ﬁnancial institutions. Macroprudential policies should be
different in the leaning and cleaning phases - ﬁrstly the prevention of systemic risk, and then, if prevention fails,
mitigation of the impacts when risks materialize. The second, cross-sectional, dimension of systemic risk reﬂects
the interrelationships between individual ﬁnancial institutions at a given point in time via both their mutual and
chained exposures (either direct exposures or similarity in investment). The time and cross-sectional dimensions
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As mentioned in previous sections, within these endogenous boom and bust cycles, DSGE
models with a ﬁnancial sector are able to ﬁt the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system. This
originates from their ability to capture the endogenous relation between the real economy and
the ﬁnancial sector and to better model the feedback effects.
However, the DSGE type of models will never replace stress testing, especially in its cross-
sectional dimension. They are not able to include detailed information on the distribution of
individual banks’ characteristics, which is crucial in the assessment of the sustainability of the
banking sector. Also, such models are not able to assess interbank contagion. DSGE models
based on representative agents will not be able to cover the detailed structure of banking sector
balancesheetsasusedinad-hocstress-testingexercises(e.g. theriskinaspeciﬁcpartofthecor-
porate sector, such as the property development sector). Thus, traditional stress testing, though
methodologically quite simple, will always have an advantage in terms of ﬂexibility. Therefore,
it is clear that DSGE models with a ﬁnancial sector will complement rather than replace current
stress-testing practice. It has to be mentioned that DSGE models with a ﬁnancial sector have to
be tailor-made for each country. In the case of the Czech Republic, this customization should
reﬂect the surplus of liquidity in the banking sector. Also, it has take into account developments
in the ﬁnancial sector, especially fast growth of housing loans and foreign ownership of domes-
tic banks. It also has to differentiate between types of loans, and at least between household and
corporate sector loans. Contrary to other countries, it does not have to include foreign currency
loans.
7. Conclusions
In this survey, mechanisms for including ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁnancial rigidities into
general equilibrium models are described. The inclusion of these mechanisms is motivated by
the observed property that even a small ﬁnancial shock can cause a signiﬁcant and long-term
response. General equilibrium models can help identify the origin of shocks and are useful for
the analysis of shock transmission between sectors of the economy. Also, these models are
useful for various monetary policy experiments and predictions of shock impacts. Standard-
ized versions of these models, however, expect the ﬁnancial markets to function smoothly and
provide external sources of capital without price distortions and without limits.
Financial frictions can be included by introducing an external ﬁnancing premium due to the
risk of a debtor defaulting on a ﬁnancial contract for the provision of external resources. The
premium originates from costly monitoring of the debtor.
Financial frictions can also be included by imposing restrictions on the amount of external
sources that the debtor may obtain. This restriction is based on the need to collateralize the loan
to cover inability to fulﬁll obligations under a ﬁnancial contract.
Both of these approaches for including ﬁnancial frictions lead to the emergence of a ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism, whose presence leads to the ampliﬁcation of shocks. This ampliﬁcation
can explain the observed volatility of aggregate economic output. However, these approaches
do not specify a role for ﬁnancial intermediaries. This survey also contains a description of
approaches to specifying this role in ﬁnancial markets. However, it is often found that the
inclusion of ﬁnancial intermediaries mutes the extent of the ﬁnancial accelerator. Despite the
rapid expansion of the use of general equilibrium models, these models are not yet able to
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an analysis by Tovar (2009) highlights the role of these models in the decisions of central banks.
Describing the observed data properties is a challenge for these models and their users, who will
face more complex models whose properties and responses are difﬁcult to manage, analyze, and
communicate.
The use of the ﬁnancial frictions DSGE model in practical monetary policy is currently limited
by the absence of a uniﬁed approach representing the “state of the art”. The absence of a
standardized approach originates from the large number of approaches to the implementation of
ﬁnancial frictions. Moreover, to deliver operational models with operational ﬁnancial frictions,
it is difﬁcult to model several types of frictions at the same time. The estimation/calibration
of such models is complicated by the low frequency of episodes of ﬁnancial stress. Because
of these uncertainties, the policy of the CNB is to develop several alternative satellite models
which complement the core prediction model. This development currently covers several types
of models with a ﬁnancial accelerator extended to include non-state-contingent contracts. It also
coversmodelswithcollateralconstraintslinkedtohousingprices, whichareextendedtoinclude
substitution between rented and owner-occupied housing. Moreover, streams of development
are focusing on models with an explicit role for banks and their capital.
The use of DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions in macroprudential policy is even less straight-
forward than their use in monetary policy. This is due to the broader setup and objectives of
macroprudential policy, which are not settled yet. DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions can
be used to create scenarios for existing macroprudential analysis tools and stress testing. The
introduction of DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions may help to improve estimation of the
satellite stress-testing models and eventually absorb some of the satellite models. DSGE mod-
els featuring an explicit role for the banking sector can help improve modeling of feedback
effects between the real economy and ﬁnancial variables. DSGE models can be helpful for
extending the forecast horizon in the current forecasting framework. Within “boom and bust”
cycles this could improve modeling of the gradual build-up of risks during the “leaning phase”
of the ﬁnancial cycle.
Finally, DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions should deliver new insights into the time dimen-
sion of systemic risk and cast more light on ﬁnancial sector procyclicality. However, the current
state of DSGE modeling does not provide enough evidence that this type of model will be able
to replace stress testing, especially in its cross-sectional dimension.Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models 31
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